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a call to resist illegitimate authority 
THE FALKLANDS 
AND THE BOMB 
What if Argentina had The Bomb? 
What if behind the comic opera exterior of the British 
armada sailing against Argentina there lurked the possi-
bility of a "nuclear exchange"? 
There has never been even a small war between two 
countries that both possessed nuclear weapons. Yet the 
time is surely coming closer when two nuclear powers 
engage in armed conflict. Last year the US government 
estimated that 12 non-nuclear nations would have the 
technical capability of detonating a nuclear bomb by 
1984. Eleven more, including Argentina, were expected 
to have that capability by the end of the decade. 
If Argentina possessed even a small arsenal of nuclear 
weapons wouldn't the British fleet be carrying a 
"deterent"? And, following the logic of Alexander 
Haig, would not Argentina leave open the possibility of 
a first use of tactical nuclear weapons if confronted with 
overwhelming "conventional" force? Surely members 
of the Argentine general staff must even now be arguing 
that Britain would never dare to undertake their rescue 
expedition if Argentina had a nuclear threat. What 
lessons are the generals of other potential nuclear 
powers drawing from this conflict? 
Argentina possesses an operating nuclear power 
plant, and has ·already produced enough plutonium to 
make a bomb. The US played a significant early role in 
Argentina's nuclear energy program, but in recent years 
has refused to do so because Argentina has not signed 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty or agreed to accept safe-
guards_ on nuclear fuel. Switzerland and West Germany 
have stepped in, selling a heavy water plant and a power 
·reactor to Argentina without requiring safeguards. 
Since 1980 Argentina and Brazil have been cooperating 
in nuclear energy development, and Argentina in turn 
has been supplying assistance to the nuclear energy 
programs of Peru, Paraguay, Chile and other Latin 
American countries. Several planes in Argentina's air 
force are capable of delivering nuclear weapons, 
including more than 100 US A-4 Skyhawks. 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 included a 
pledge by the nuclear powers to conduct serious negotia-
tions to achieve nuclear disarmament. Yet since that 
time the number of strategic nuclear warheads has 
tripled. Unless the nuclear powers disarm, other nations 
will push ahead with nuclear weapons, and the next 
Falklands expedition won't be so funny. 
''FREE ELECTIONS'' 
IN EL SALVADOR 
FRANK BRODHEAD 
Is "El Salvador" Spanish for "Vietnam"? In spite of 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig's stout denials, the 
analogy just won't go away. The US 'role in the recent 
elections in El Salvador, with its official State Depart-
ment observer team, evokes the memory of Vietnam 
once again. For how can we forget Vietnam's presiden-
tial elections of 1967, and the US observer team which 
judged this exercise in fraud to be ''reasonably free and 
reasonably honest''? 
The March 28th elections in El Salvador were called 
by one US official ''the most thoroughly observed 
elections here and maybe anywhere else." At least 
twenty countries responded to El Salvador's inyitation 
to send official observer teams to view the balloting. Yet 
many countries refused El Salvador's invitation, and 
among those sending observers were Argentina, Chile, 
Uruguay and Guatemala, hardly experts in the practice 
of fair elections. Much of the international opposition 
to sending observers, and to the elections themselves, 
supported the rebels' claims that the elections were 
inherently unfair. With their leaders marked for death 
by hit squads based in the army and the right wing 
parties, El Salvador's revolutionaries claimed that 
political campaigning would be suicidal for them, and 
called for a boycott of the elections. 
Much of the international criticism of the proposed 
elections for a constituent assembly was based on the 
assumption that the army and the Duarte regime would 
· receive a rubber stamp. In an attempt to legitimize the 
elections in the eyes of the international community and 
a restive American public, therefore, the State Depart-
ment announced in early March that they would send an 
official observer team to monitor the election, thus 
ensuring its fairness. Led by Senator Nancy Kassebaum 
of Kansas, the team included two "election experts", 
Richard Scammon and Howard Penniman, both of 
whom were part of the observer team sent to South 
Vietnam in 1967. 
Washington's original goal was to legitimate a sweep 
by Duarte and the Christian Democrats. As the election 
drew closer, however, the function of the observer team 
changed. While speculation grew _ that the right wing 
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parties would gain a majority, and that the proto-fascist 
ARENA party headed by former Maj. Roberto 
D' Aubuisson tnight actually gain a plurality, the 
Reagan administration backpeddled furiously. Appear-
ing on NBC's "Meet the Press" on election day, Haig 
stressed that the US was not wedded to a particular 
candidate, but to a set of policies. If the voters elected a 
constituent assembly dominated by right wing forces, 
"that's their business." Thus the role of "free and fair 
elections", monitored by observers from many nations, 
now became the means by which the Reagan administra-
tion could gracefully transfer its support from the 
alleged center of El Salvador's political spectrum to 
unabashed supporters of the right. 
The process of legitimizing an election is a complex 
one. But it is not obvious that high class poll watchers 
from other countries are adequate to the task. Because 
election experts Scammon and Penniman have now 
given their stamp of approval to both El Salvador's 
election and South Vietnam's presidential election of 
1967, it might help us to understand the process at work 
in El Salvador better if · we briefly look at South 
Vietnam's election and the role played in it by the 
official US observer team. 
Free Elections 
In early 1967, noted the Pentagon Papers, "pre-
nomination maneuvering and legitimacy of the Presi-
dential campaign were the subjects which occupied 
American attention· above all else.'' At that time the US 
had 385,000 troops in Vietnam, and military strategists 
were calling for up to 200,000 more. Yet US opinion on 
the war was polarized, and the unsavory image of the 
South Vietnam military dictatorship in the US media 
impeded the Johnson administration's plans for more 
decisive military action. "Free elections" were the 
answer to this impasse. 
But not too free. Washington feared that the election 
would split the South Vietnamese military. The military, 
in turn, feared civilian rule. But all could agree that 
"neutralists" and "leftists" had to be barred from 
running as candidates or even voting, and after much 
maneuvering the military united on Chief of State Thieu 
and Marshall ("Hitler is my hero") Ky as the winning 
ticket. 
But even within the restrictive conditions set for the 
elections, the actions of the Thieu-Ky forces led to wide-
spread accusations of fraud, both within South Vietnam 
and the US. Twelve US Senators charged that the cam-
paign was a "fraud" and a "charade," and President 
Johnson himself admitted that the elections were "not 
without blemish.'' 
And so the team of 20 election observers was packed 
off to Vietnam to monitor the final three days of the 
campaign, where they had a brief and controlled visit. 
One member examined ballot boxes to make sure they 
had a bottom. Another compared the election to those 
back in Beverly Hills. Prominently featured were the 
"election experts," one of whom called the election 
2 
''reasonably free and reasonably honest,'' while 
anqther poined out ''that irregularities were unlikely 
since the election law forbade them." 
But even as the observer team was reporting to 
Johnson that the election had been "fair" and "admir-
able,'' evidence of widespread fraud was accumulating 
1n South Vietnam. Massive demonstratfons were held 1n 
Saigon, and a committee of South Vietnam's Assembly 
declared the election invalid because of a blatant 
"pattern of fraud." But under pressure from the US 
embassy and the Thieu-Ky military forces who 
surrounded the Assembly and invaded its balconies, the 
Assembly at last voted to confirm the election results. 
The election runnerup, who campaigned on a peace 
platform, was jailed. 
The function of the monitoring team in Vietnam, as 
in El Salvador, was to give the elections the appearance 
of legitimacy. In this they were only momentarily 
successful. A month later came the demonstration at the 
Pentagon and the beginning of a militant anti-war 
movement in the US. And at the end of January, 1968 
came the Tet offensive, which turned President 
Johnson's hopes to dust. While the Reagan administra-
tion is congratulating itself over the supposedly high 
turnout in El Salvador, moreover, it should ponder a 
turnout of 84% in South Vietnam just four months 
before Tet. The case of Vietnam, in short, should call 
into question whether techniques that might be used to 
ensure free and fair elections in Mayor Daley's Chicago 
are adequate to measure the will of the people in a 
country undergoing a revolution. · 
The real function of El Salvador's closely observed 
elections may well be a tragic one. When the US sent a 
team of "independent" observers to legitimize the 
South Vietnamese election in 1967, it cemented itself 
forever to the Thieu-Ky regime to which· it gave birth. 
One can now imagine Alexander Haig countering liberal 
congressional protests against further US support for El 
Salvador's murderous coalition of right wing thugs with 
smug appeals to "the process of democracy" and "the 
will of the Salvadoran people." In doing so, however, 
he should bear in mind the observations about the 1967 
Vietnam election made by George McT. K~hin and 
John Lewis in their study The United States in Vietnam: 
"With the elections over, President Johnson could now 
assure the American public that the sacrifices they were 
making in Vietnam were in support of a 'legitimate,' 
freely elected government. . . . The opportunity for 
effectively broadening the base of the Saigon regime 
had been lost .... As a consequence, in any future nego-
tiations Washington's options would be narrowly 
restricted by the predictably rigid viewpoint of a highly 
unrepresentative South Vietnamese government, whose 
popular base was so narrow that it could not risk any 
meaningful compromise without courting its own 
destruction." (p. 359) 
NICARAGUA'S 
MISKITO PROBLEM 
AMANDA CLAIBORNE 
According to Alexander Haig, they were being 
dropped from airplanes. He showed us a picture of 
burned bodies; only problem was the picture was four 
years old, a massacre by Somoza's National Guard. The 
Cuban Missile Crisis expert showed us ''before and 
after" photos of destroyed Miskito villages. Jeane 
Kirkpatrick told us that the Nicaraguan government was 
carrying out ''a campaign of systematic violence." 
What do the Sandinistas say? : 
The revolutionary government was forced to relocate the 
riverside communities in more secure areas of the national 
territory where our Miskito brethren will have, for the first 
time, access to systematic medical assistance, education, 
adequate housing, electricity and cultivable land. The relo-
cation has given rise to a ferocious, slanderous campaign of 
lies mounted by the CIA and the State Department against 
our revolution. - Sergio Ramirez Mercado (The Nation, 
4/3/82) 
Well what do we believe: bloodbath or a solicitous 
government concerned above all with the safety and 
well-being of the Indians? 
The reality is considerably more complicated than the 
explanation so far advanced by the Sandinistas, but 
most certainly falls far short of the bloodbath thesis 
expounded by our State Department (see N. Chomsky 
and E. S. Herman's The Washington Connection and 
Third World Fascism for State Department use of the 
"nefarious and mythical" bloodbath in Indochina to 
excuse its own more "constructive" bloodbaths there). 
Some History 
The Miskitos are the largest Indian group in Nica-
ragua. Along with the much smaller Sumu and Rama 
tribes they make up about 10% of the Nicaraguan popu-
lation. Although a minority of the population as a 
whole, on Nicaragua's isolated and sparsely populated 
Atlantic Coast they were, until recently, the majority. 
Mainly due to its geographic isolation, the Atlantic 
Coast and its people have historically enjoyed a good 
deal of autonomy. In the early colonial period, the 
Spaniards failed to take over the Coast and the Miskitos 
thus escaped the brutal treatment suffered by Indians 
elsewhere under the Spanish yoke. While maintaining 
their subsistence agricultural economy, the Miskitos 
began trade with British merchants for manufactured 
goods, from one of which, the musket, they derived 
their name. At one point the British invented a country 
of "Mosquitia" and crowned a king who was, inciden-
tally, amenable to making his country a British protec-
torate. But, according to Theodore Macdonald, an 
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anthropologist writing in Cultural Survival Quarterly: 
The Miskito monarchy was always more symbolic than 
political. . . For a few Miskitos, the kingdom provided 
justification for attacks on neighbors or demands for 
tribute ... For the average Miskito, the king mattered little. 
Although appointed by the Crown, kings could not exercise 
authority without first consulting with a council of elders, 
and· (Macdonald quotes anthropologist Mary Helms) "even 
the'n their directions were followed only if their constituents 
felt inclined to do so." 
Despite the fact that the ''kingdom'' was primarily a 
convenient British fiction, shortly after problems first 
arose between the Sandinistas and the Miskito leader-
ship Madonald tells us that ''the Nicaraguan press 
claimed that [the Miskitos] were trying to re-establish 
the 'kingdom'." 
In 1894 the Atlantic Coast was incorporated into the 
rest of Nicaragua and North American imperialism 
replaced British colonialism. The Miskitos no longer 
traded food for muskets, but instead worked in US-
owned gold and silver mines and grew bananas for 
export. Macdonald notes that 
bananas were produced in Miskito gardens rather than on 
the extensive land-gobbling plantations which dominated 
Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. None of these new 
salaried or contract economic activities precluded regular 
maintenance of garden plots. Subsistence farming, with the 
security and economic independence it provided, continued 
to dominate an economy which was also linked to capital-
ism and wage labor. 
Following World War II, US lumbering operations 
largely denuded the huge pine forests of the region and 
forcibly removed"Indians from their l~md. To revive the 
industry exhausted by the early 1960's, Somoza initiated 
a massive reforestation project. According to 
Macdonald 
Large tracts of land utilized by the Miskitos were ''nation-
alized'' and the Miskito were prohibited from extracting 
lumber. For the first time, the state and market economies 
were seen as a threat to the Miskito's claim to land and 
natural resources. Shortly thereafter, in 1967, local Indian 
organizations developed along the Coco River. Four years 
later, Nicaragua's first national Indian organization, 
Alpromisu, was formed to protect rights to land and 
natural resources. Violence punctuated Alpromisu's early 
history. Somoza's guardia disrupted meetings and fre-
quently jailed Alpromisu officials. The organization was 
charged with attempting to encourage separatism, and 
regionalism, and associating with foreign enemies. 
Enter the Sandinistas, as Macdonald continues 
In 1979 with the end of a war which, for geographical 
reasons, incorporated few Miskitos and the installation of a 
regime which most Indians only partially understood, 
Miskitos were hesitant to give up their local organization. 
So they established MISURASAT A which means Miskito, 
Sumu, Rama, and Sandinistas, working together .... 
MISURASAT A cautiously embraced the Sandinistas. 
However, in August 1980, when plans were announced for 
nationalizing lands on the Atlantic Coast, MISURASAT A 
[which had not been consulted before the announcement] 
quickly obtained the Council of State's approval to post-
pone any nationalization until Indian land claims were 
settled. 
The Miskito's reaction to proposed nationalization of 
land and resources along the Atlantic Coast was . . . a 
response to a perceived threat against their subsistence 
security and their status as equals in relations with nation 
states. Prior to 1980 the only serious threat to such 
freedoms led to the formation of Alpromisu. As 
MISURASA TA worked to assure rights to land and natural 
resources, its efforts produced familiar accusations of 
racism, separatism, and rumors of an incipient regional 
"revolt." 
These accusations led to the arrest of 33 leaders of 
MISURASATA in February of 1981 and to the subse-
quent exodus of several thousand Miskitos to neighbor-
ing Honduras. 
Sandinista relations with the Indians were not helped 
by the initial implementation of the literacy and 
agrarian reform programs. The literacy campaign was 
conducted only in Spanish despite the fact that most 
Miskitos speak English, -or Indian languages. The 
agrarian reform project became a cause for misunder-
standings and bitterness too because agrarian reform 
officials resented the reluctance on the part of the 
Miskitos to depend on centralized government to supply 
seeds and markets for their crops. Old arrangements 
with usorious merchants may not have seemed prefer-
able to outsiders, but at least they were dependable, of 
no little importance to a subsistence farmer. These 
problems, however, proved relatively minor. The 
Sandinistas realized they had made mistakes and 
MISURASA TA officials understood that these 
mistakes were, as Macdonald notes, "not structural, 
but rather methodological.'' However, other more 
important problems remained to be solved. 
Natural Resources 
At the heart of the difficulties between the Sandinista 
government and MISURASAT A is the question of 
natural resources: Who "owns" the Atlantic Coast? 
The map that MISURASAT A prepared to substantiate 
Indian land claims shows that they claim over 45,000 
km 2 of the Atlantic Coast, more than 380/o of Nica-
ragua's land total. Macdonald believes that MISURA-
SAT A is willing to negotiate this percentage and that 
what is at stake is, as John C. Mohawk wrote in 
Cultural Survival Quarterly, "Sandinista recognition of 
the existence of Indian nations and landbase, aboriginal 
rights and the right to an Indian national personality.'' 
These rights the Sandinistas have so far refused to 
recognize. Mohawk discusses two points contained in a 
document entitled "Declaration of the Principles of the 
Sandinista Popular Revolution in Regards to the Indi-
genous Communities of the Atlantic Coast'' issued in 
Managua on August 12, 1981. 
Point 5 states that the government stands ready to recog-
nize Indian land rights to '' ... the lands where they have 
lived historically in the communities of the Atlantic Coast, 
already being in the form of communal (sic) or cooperative 
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ownership." That wording basically means that, like the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, the Nicaragua 
government is willing to recognize that the Indians only 
have rights within the limits of the villages they occupy, and 
implies that their rights to territory are not recognized ... 
Were the Sandinista position to be adopted by the US, the 
Black Hills would be automatically forfeited and the Sioux 
claim would be limited to the town limits of the villages ... 
All the land in between the villages would be claimed by the 
US government. Point Five appears on its fact to deny all 
Miskito rights under any treaties and it totally denies the 
concept of aboriginal rights. . . . There is no guarantee or 
even mention of any hunting and fishing rights .... 
Point 6 states that ''the natural resources of our territory 
are the property of the Nicaraguan people represented by 
the Revolutionary State ... '' the rights of the Indians are 
limited to '' ... receive a share of the benefits derived from 
the exploitation of forestry resources ... in conformity with 
national planning." 
Were point 6 to be adopted in US law, it would mean 
that the Navajo and the Lakota and the Pueblo Indians 
would have no ownership rights to oil, gas, uranium or 
other mineral resources, and arguably no rights to water, 
and they would have no power to determine the path of 
development of those resources. 
Conclusion 
The Sandinistas are between a rock and a hard place, 
economically, militarily, morally. Economically, they 
are squeezed by the US refusal to provide economic aid 
on one side, and Somoza's legacy of debt on the other. 
Trying to make their economy more self-sufficjent while 
repaying a staggering foreign debt, and simultaneously 
needing to purchase military hardware to build up the 
country's defenses is an extremely difficult task, if not an 
impossible one. The lumber on the lands claimed by 
MISURASAT A represents a source of badly needed 
export income, and so, without waiting for negotia-
tions, Nicaragua and Mexico have already embarked on 
a $56 million joint venture to cut and process lumber 
from the pine savannahs of the Coast. 
On the issue of security, the US is overtly supporting 
counter-revolutionaries massing in Honduras for an 
invasion. There have been repeated raids over the Coco 
River which is the border between the two countries. 
Undoubtedly part of the reason for the relocation of 
thousands of Miskitos is just what the Sandinistas say it 
is: the desire to remove the population from a combat 
area. It is also a move to deny the Somocistas any 
possible base of support in Indian communities, and to 
create a demilitarized zone between Honduras and Nica-
ragua (the likely reason for the Sandinistas' burning of 
Indian villages after relocations were completed). 
However, we have to note that, according to a piece by 
Macdonald in the New York Times, "resettlement 
actually was conceived in 1980 as a means to move 
Miskitos permanently onto 250 square-meter lots." 
We can only agree with Charles R. Hale, a Sandinista 
official who works on the Atlantic Coast that "(t)he 
government cannot demonstrate great political flexibil-
ity as long as Nicaragua's national sovereignty 
continues to be in danger.'' It is also true that some 
MISURASAT A leaders, whether or not their intentions 
were originally counter-revolutionary as the Sandinistas 
have charged are now openly collaborating with 
Somocistas in border raids and radio broadcasts on 
Radio 15 September which attempt to panic the Indian 
population. But we have to ask, as Mohawk does, "Is 
the defense of Indian rights a counter-revolutionary 
position? . . . Are we to support Indian people in 
struggle for their aboriginal rights against puppet 
regimes like the Somoza government but then abandon 
them when their rights are threatened by revolutionary 
governments?'' 
Obviously the real criminal in all of this is the US 
government which, by waging economic as well as 
actual war on the Sandinista government is making the 
chances for an MISURASAT A/Sandinista rapproach-
ment ever less likely and less possible. So should we 
criticize the Sandinista government at all? I believe that 
we must for three reasons: First, because the Sandinistas 
are not of one mind on how to deal with the Miskitos. 
For every official who believes, like the one who spoke 
with Macdonald, that relocation is not a burden 
because ''these people are just nomads who live in 
shacks," there are others who are not ignorant of 
Miskito culture and who have shown themselves willing 
to negotiate and to learn; Second, because the import-
ance of this issue extends beyond Nicaragua's borders. 
Indians make up a large percentage of the population of 
Latin America. In nearby Guatemala, on the brink of its 
own revolution, and where latinos and Indians have 
only recently joined forces, Indians are the majority of 
the population. They wait and watch to see how a 
revolutionary government deals with its ''Indian 
problem." Finally, we must all ask ourselves John 
Mohawk's question, and answer it. 
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THE COMING WAR 
WITH NICARAGUA 
JEFF McCONNELL 
The next three months will be critical ones for the 
·Nicaraguan people. The respected Latirt American 
Weekly Report claims that there are rumors in the 
Honduran armed forces that some kind of military 
showdown between Nicaragua and Honduras will occur 
by July. The Nation reported in January that a faction 
of the Honduran military has accepted the inevitability 
of a war with Nicaragua. A month earlier an unnamed 
"senior State Department policymaker" told the San 
Francisco Examiner that the Reagan Administration 
would have to ''face up to a fundamental decision in the 
next six months: whether to allow Nicaragua to consol-
idate its Marxist-Leninist regime, which already has 
become a base for subverting the whole hemisphere, or 
act to stop it.'' 
In late march, the National Security Council received 
options papers on possible American actions toward 
Nicaragua. Decisions made by the NSC in mid-Novem-
ber after receiving the last previous options papers led to 
grim results. Ronald Reagan signed an executive order 
on December 1 approving a broad program of covert 
political and paramilitary actions against Nicaragua. 
Almost immediately the State Department began a 
large-scale propaganda campaign against Nicaragua 
portraying its government as totalitarian and militar-
istic, bent on dominating Central America, and sold out 
to Moscow. At the height of this campaign, former 
National Guardsmen based in Honduras initiated 
"Operation Red Christmas," a paramilitary operation 
against Nicaragua in the isolated and politically sensi-
tive Atlantic Coast region. At least sixty Sandinistas 
were killed. Radio 15 September, operating from ten 
miles inside Honduras, called on the Miskito Indians of 
the Atlantic Coast to rise up against the Managua 
government. The Sandinistas responded by clearing out 
the border area, temporarily ending the attacks from 
Honduras. 
With good reason, however, the government expects 
further repetitions. On March 6, the independent El 
Nuevo Diario and the Sandinista paper Barricada 
printed a description of the invasion the Sandinistas fear 
to be imminent. Diversionary border attacks, according 
to this account, can be expected all along the Nica~ 
raguan-Honduran border, while the invasion force 
would land on the Atlantic Coast. Jose Cardenal stated 
in a recent interview in the Mexican paper Excelsior that 
his anti-Sandinista forces were waiting in the mountain-
ous border region to begin attacks similar to those 
described in the two Nicaraguan papers. And the 
December San Francisco Examiner interview with US 
officials offered a similar s~e_n~io. Pe~haps coinciden-
tally, the Bay of Pigs invasion was mounted from· this 
area along the Atlantic Coast in 1961. 
It is for these and many other reasons that Nicaragua 
sought the help of the UN Security Council in late 
March and early Apr~. The r~sponse of the US was to 
veto a measure that would have empowered the Secre-
tary-General to investigate Nicaragua's charges that the 
US was fomenting a military attack from Honduras, 
charges Jeane .Kirkpatrick labeled "ridiculous." .Kirk-
patrick defended the veto by arguing that the OAS, and 
not the UN, was the proper forum for discussing such 
charges. She did not mention the fact that many OAS 
states had already given behind-the-scenes approval to 
the US plan to destabilize Nicatagua, nor the fact that 
several were actively plotting alongside the US. 
The US has been working to build Honduras up mili-
tarily to carry out these efforts, and promoted the 
cosmetic elections there in November 1981 that installed 
civilians but actually left power in the hands of the mili-
tary. These elections have enabled the Reagan Admini-
stration to increase military aid to Honduras and to 
off er Honduras more economic aid than any other 
Caribbean Basin nations except El Salvador and 
Jamaica. To carry this out, the US has increased its 
embassy staff 400/o over the last two years. 
In November 1981, at the same time the NSC was 
approving its campaign against Nicaragua and just 
before the Honduran elections, the Reagan Administra-
tion installed as its new ambassador to Honduras John 
Negroponte. Negroponte is an experienced diplomat 
who has had ties with the CIA while serving in Saigon as 
political officer from 1964 to 1968 and while on the 
NSC staff during the Chile years, 1970 to 1973. He is 
among those who envision a possible future regional 
"gendarme" role for Honduras. Negroponte has over-
seen recent growth in both the CIA station and the US 
military mission in Tegulcigalpa. Since late 1981, the 
number of Green Berets and other military advisers in 
Honduras has increased from 14 to 97. AID has financed 
millions of dollars of road construction in Honduras 
since 1980, presumably to make it easier to move the 
Honduran army throughout the countryside, alloca-
tions for such construction increasing substantially 
since Negroponte's arrival. In addition, the US and 
Honduras are known to be discussing the Pentagon's 
plans to build military airfields on a Honduran island in 
the Gulf of Fonesca off the coast of Nicaragua. This 
airfield would be used by the US to airlift troops and 
supplies into the region during a crisis. The head of the 
Honduran armed forces in fact said in late March that 
he could foresee the use of US troops in Honduras to 
def end his country - presumably from Nicaragua or 
from its own population. 
Right now, Honduran armed forces are being used by 
the US mainly to militarize the border areas with El 
Salvador and Nicaragua. As the head of the US South-
ern Command in, Panama Lt. Gen. Wallace Nutting 
said recently, insurrections like that in El Salvador have 
_historically been defeated only ''when the international 
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political borders have been secured." The Hondurans 
have cooperated extensively with Salvadoran troops 
along the common border. The Hondurans police 
refugee camps inside Honduras and have allowed Salva-
doran troops into them. Recently, World Vision, a 
fundamentalist and steadfastly anti-communist relief 
organization, took over CED EN, the ecumenical group 
which has been overseeing refugees in Honduras under 
UN auspices. When the staff of CEDEN resigned in 
protest and formed their own organization, the chief of 
the Honduran military chose the World Vision-
controlled CEDEN over the new organization to handle 
the refugees. World Vision is reported to have had three 
Honduran intelligence officers on its staff in the past. 
The US has consistently refused offers from Nica-
ragua to help Nicaragua and Honduras set up a joint 
border patrol to police arms traffic into El Salvador. 
Instead, the US and Honduras have held joint naval 
maneuvers in the Gulf of Fonesca the reason being, so 
says the US, to train the Honduran navy in the inter-
ception of arms. But with the indifference shown by the 
US to the border-patrol proposal as well as the recent 
report by Raymond Bonner of the New York Times that 
he had been told by Honduran military officers that 
there was no evidence of overland arms traffic through 
Honduras, Nicaraguan officials suspect the maneuvers 
were staged as a provocation to Nicaragua. The inability 
of the US to produce credible evidence of substantial 
arms traffic has compounded the suspicion that the 
arms issue is entirely US propaganda. 
On the other hand, Honduran military officers have 
had a hand in the border incidents between anti-Sandi-
nista Nicaraguan exiles and the Nicaraguan army. 
Thousands of these exiles operate freely from 
Honduran territory. Although Honduran officials deny 
this, they do not permit reporters to travel in the border 
area. Anti-Sandinista Nicaraguans captured in para-
military operations have told of involvement by top 
Honduran officers. In late 1981, after the crash of a 
Honduran military aircraft, among those discovered on 
board was Steadman Fagoth, leader of a Miskito Indian 
faction that has joined former National Guardsmen in 
attacks on Sandinista troops in the Atlantic Coast 
region. In late March, there were actually several minor 
clashes between Nicaraguan and Honduran armed 
forces. 
It is unclear what role US advisers are playing in these 
events. The Nicaraguan government has called the 
presence of the 97 advisers "suspicious," but it has 
produced no direct evidence of US involvement in the 
border incidents. However, CBS reported in late March 
that a US Green Beret was approached by a US officer 
about possible work against Nicaragua. Also, among 
the options approved in November 1981 were the 
creation by the CIA of a 500-man paramilitary unit to 
sabotage vital economic installations inside Nicaragua 
and CIA cooperation with Argentine efforts at training 
a 1000-member anti-Sandinista army in Honduras. The 
Times reported in March that Americans are not to be 
involved directly in these forces although two or three 
Spanish-speaking CIA officers are to carry out liaison, 
"sharing intelligence and pointing out targets." How-
ever, the CBS report contradicts the Times story as does 
an NBC report that Americans were to be involved 
directly in the operations. 
Some of the duties of the 97 US advisers in Honduras 
have been disclosed. Negroponte reports that eleven of 
the advisers are permanently assigned to Honduras and 
86 are on temporary duty with "military training 
teams" (MTTs). In a six-week program that ended in 
late march, three US sergeants from these MTTs taught 
precision parachute jumping to seven Hondurans. 
Advisers told NBC's Brian Ross that such training was 
"perfect for infiltration." Other MTTs in Honduras 
include a team to help enlarge the Honduran navy, a 
group of specialists in airport security, a communica-
tions survey team, and a team training Hondurans in 
"arms interdiction techniques." The communications 
survey team is working to improve, among other things, 
the ability of the army to communicate with the army 
command post at Puerto Lempira, a city where exile 
groups are .also known to be training Miskito refugees 
from Nicaragua for paramilitary activities. A recent 
Newsweek report asserted that US Green Berets among 
these MTTs are training 13-year-old boys for combat. 
Brian Ross reported being told by sources that advisers 
are also providing weapons to exile groups being trained 
by Argentine officers near Tegucigalpa. 
Reporting in late February from Tegucigalpa, Alan 
Riding wrote in the New York Times that ''the local 
United States mission appears to have established direct 
contact with Mr. Fagoth and other anti-Sandinista 
leaders." Nicaraguan exiles confirmed to a Knight-
Ridder reporter in Tegucigalpa recently that a "mechan-
ism" had been set up "for contacts between Washing-
ton and a committee of Nicaraguan exiles representing 
diverse points of view." It thus appears that implemen-
tation of the N.S.C.-approved plan may have begun. 
These same exiles also confirmed that Argentina has 
been involved in assisting anti-Sandinista groups in 
Honduras, at least since May 1981. Other press reports 
assert that Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile and 
Honduras have all been involved in discussions and 
preparations for op.erations similar to those approved 
by the N.S.C. for as long as two years. Yet there have 
reportedly been differences between the US and Argen-
7 
tina over tactics. Although the Carter Administration 
during its last months explored the possibility of 
supporting former Somoza supporters, the Reagan 
Administration is said to have rejected this option on 
the advice of CIA officials who stated that these 
Somocistas were too tainted ever to have any future 
credibility among the Nicaraguan people. The US thus 
decided to put its weight behind opponents of the 
Sandinistas with anti-Somoza credentials. The Argen-
tina-trained force, however, is made up largely of 
Somoza supporters. Full cooperation with Argentina is 
thus said to be difficult until the pro-Somoza and anti-
Somoza opposition groups begin to work together. The 
anti-Somoza groups, sharing the US concerns, claim 
they cannot do this, pragmatically or morally. 
The US has actually assisted both groups of oppo-
nents, however. Pedro Ortega, a wealthy Nicaraguan 
industrialist in exile, makes regular trips to Miami to 
recruit other exiles into his Nicaraguan Liberation 
Army, the group thought to be responsible for most of 
the casualties along the Honduran border. The recruit-
ment activities of Ortega clearly violate the Neutrality 
Act, yet neither is he arrested nor is his visa revoked. 
Similarly, thousands of exiles from the Somoza regime 
have been permitted to settle in the US. Those not guilty 
of war crimes are clearly "economic refugees," fleeing 
the tighter control that the Sandinistas have placed on 
the Nicaraguan economy. They should be sent back to 
Nicaragua under the same laws that are said to apply to 
Haitian refugees. In fact, lawyers for the Haitians 
discovered a vast case of inequitable application of the 
law under a discovery request filed in 1980. Many other 
exiles, however, are war criminals and should, accord-
ing to the law, be extradicted. However, the US has 
discouraged extradition requests by Nicaragua, granting 
political asylum to some, and allowing others to remain 
while their asylum requests are pending. It is this pool of 
exiles Ortega recruits from. 
The other main exile group is the Nicaraguan Demo-
cratic Union, or UDN, the group for which the Reagan 
Administration approved support. The UDN is 
composed largely of business leaders and their support-
ers who, although they sided with the Sandinistas during 
the revolution, quickly became disillusioned once they 
saw · the Sandinistas move in substantive ways to 
separate politics and money in Nicaragua. The UDN 
and the non-military bourgeois opponents of the 
Sandinistas inside Nicaragua have been the principle 
exploiters of the rhetoric of human rights in order to 
intimidate the Sandinistas into restoring to financial 
interests the freedom to control political debate in 
Nicaragua. In addition to approving support for the 
paramilitary efforts of the UDN, the Reagan Admini-
stration is also supporting, through AID grants and 
CIA payoffs, efforts by political parties, business 
organizations and labor unions inside Nicaragua to 
restore political power into the hands of those the US 
can do business with. 
Jeff McConnell is editing a book on the CIA based on a lecture series 
given at MIT in January. 
GRANTS 
MEDIA NETWORK (208 West 13th St., NY, NY 
10011) 
Fortunately for all of us on the planet, the US disarma-
ment movement is growing by leaps and bounds. In 
cities and towns all over this country dedicated people 
have been busy educating their friends and neighbors to 
the real but preventable threat of nuclear war. An 
important tool in the education process has been visual 
media: films, videotapes and slideshows. A recent Resist 
grant went to the Disarmament l\,_1edia Project of the 
Media Network to help them collect, compile, and 
disseminate information nationally about the use of 
visual media for grassroots organizing on disarmament, 
military spending and related issues. The crucial aspect 
of this project will be the dissemination of whatever 
material is generated. To this end, Media Network has 
obtained the sponsorship of n_ational organizattons with 
local chapters including the· Coalition for A New 
Foreign and Military Policy (49 chapters), Mobilization 
for Survival (130 chapters), American Friends Service 
Committee and SANE. Other organizations that they 
plan to contact include the National Council of 
Churches and Clergy and Laity Concerned. 
CHE-LUMUMBA SCHOOL (c/o Panua Putnam, 
Every Woman's Center, Wilder Hall, University of 
Mass, Amherst, MA 01002). 
For over ten years Che-Lumumba has been providing a 
program of political education and cultural enlighten-
ment for elementary school children from Third World 
and White working class backgrounds. The school was 
founded by Third World parents convinced that the 
American public school system fails to teach children 
the truth about their histories, the struggles of their 
people and the contributions of those struggles to build-
ing the nation. Parents also felt that schools teach the 
culture and ideology of the dominant class including 
racism, sexism, and class exploitation. Che-Lumumba 
parents believe that the essence of an alternative educa-
tion must be a multicultural curriculum focusing on the 
political history and culture of Third World and 
working class White people. The curriculum has had a 
different theme each year: Self-Determination, Workers 
of the World, Coming to America (the immigrant 
experience), and this year Native Americans. Che-
Lumumba's children are studying the lifestyles, 
histories and struggles of Native Americans as well as 
their relationship to land and the environment. As part 
of the program, the children are corresponding with 
children at The Freedom School of the Mohawk Nation 
in upstate New York and plan a visit there later this 
year. Resist's grant provided seed money for a fund-
raising project · to help the school achieve greater 
financial self-sufficiency. .. 
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VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (PO 
Box 25592, Chicago, IL 60625). 
Most Resist contributors will remember the moving 
demonstration in the spring of 1971 - Operation 
Dewey Canyon III - when Vietnam veterans threw 
back their war medals on the steps of the Capitol. This 
year, the eleventh anniversary of that demonstration 
and the fiftieth anniversary of the Bonus March of 
World War I veterans, VVAW is sponsoring a "limited 
incursion into Congressland." For four days (May 12-15) 
Vietnam vets, vets from other eras, friends and support-
ers plan to demonstrate, rally, march, lobby and learn. 
Demands that will be raised include those common to all 
vets ("No VA Cutbacks"); those specific to Vietnam 
vets ("Test, Treat and Compensate Agent Orange 
Victims"); and those relating to a broader movement 
("No Aid to El Salvador, No War"). 
VV AW has been in the forefront of the progressive 
veterans movement since the days of the Vietnam war. 
They publish a newspaper, The Veteran, with recent 
issues being devoted to Agent Orange, incarcerated 
veterans, and US intervention in El Salvador and Nica-
ragua. A regular feature of The Veteran is "Recol-
lections,'' an extremely moving column that provides a 
space for veterans to communicate their experiences of 
life and death in Indochina. These columns have been 
collected in a pamphlet of the same name ($1.50) which 
is by itself an eloquent, painful argument against war. 
Resist's grant was to print a descriptive brochure setting 
forth the demands of the action. 
During the United Nations Special 
Session on Disarmament join the 
massive march and rally on June 
12. Then on June 14 join in a non-
violent civil disobedience action 
[nonviolence training required] to 
blockade the five major nuclear 
powers at their Missions to the 
United Nations: 
• United States • Soviet Union 
• China • Britain • France 
For more information, contact 
Civil Disobedience Campaign 
339 Lafayette Street 
New York, N.Y.10012 
(212) 777-4737 
